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ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
Richard Jolly*
Recent increases in oil prices have had such profound effects on the
world economy, actual and potential, that in many areas we are only
just beginning to grasp the implications. Moreover, the inevitable
uncertainties over the course of future prices mean that the exact
magnitude of the changes involved are a matter of debate - and
often the debate over the statistics diverts attention from the broad
implications of what is involved. This paper is an attempt to
emphasise the broad economic issues, by presenting a framework
within which some of the main statistics can be summarised, the
implications analysed and some options for policy, national and
international, explored.
The main thrust of argument is that the oil price increases have in the
broadest of terms improved world income distribution between the
rich countries and the Third World (benefiting some poor countries
within the Third World as well as some rich ones) but at the same
time worsened income distribution between Third World countries,
to the particular detriment of some of the poorest countries, whose
weak performance in terms of growth and distribution over the
previous decade was already of very serious concern. In terms of long
run action, international and national policy should now attempt to
build further and more fundamental changes in world economic
relationships on these initial changes, rather than seek to reverse
them, especially by introducing measures which will help to reduce
world poverty and support broad-based development. In the short and
medium run, the "staggering disequilibrium" of the current situation
is such that a variety of actions is urgently required - particularly
measures by both the developed and oil exporting countries to
encourage and facilitate recycling of oil revenues directly and
indirectly to Third World countries in ways which benefit the hardest
hit countries and the poorest groups within them.
* Richard Jolly is Director of the Institute of Development Studies.
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The Magnitude of the Economic Changes Involved
From January 1970 to January 1974, oil prices rose approximately
six and a half times, of which about a four and a half-fold increase
took place over the preceding 12 months. The World Bank estimated
in mid-January 1974 that these additional revenues of the 11 oil
exporting countries from higher oil prices will in 1974 exceed 1973
total revenue by some sus 65 billion. Of this, some $US 55 billion is
estimated to come from developed countries, the remaining sus io
billion from less developed countries.'
The increase in export earnings of the Third World oil exporting
countries from oil price increases in one year alone is almost as great
as total Third World export earnings ($74 billion, including oil) two
years earlier. As a shift in world income distribution, it is difficult to
think of any change of comparable magnitude and significance
arising from an increase in the price of a single item of world trade. It
is in this sense that many argue that the oil price increases mark a
watershed in world trading relations. It is without doubt a watershed
in relations between the oil producing countries and the rest of the
world. It may also prove to be a watershed in its psychological (and
political) repercussions on thinking elsewhere in the Third World
about world trading relationships. This may be the real significance
of the "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order" and the "Programme of Action", issued at the
conclusion of the special 5ession of the United Nations General
Assembly held in April.
The Impact on Third World Countries
The impact on individual countries - and on the different groups
These estimates refer only to the direct effects of higher prices of petroleum
imports, not the indirect effects of the higher prices of oil-based products, such
as fertilizers or polymers. See the paper by Frank Ellis for further details and
estimates. Note also that this paper concentrates on the effects of the oil price
increases. Readers should not assume however that these are the only import
price increases causing concern to the Third World. The UNCTAD secretariat
estimates that as a group, the Third World countries will be hit harder in 1974
by increases in the prices of manufactures and even the bulk of the gains from
higher food import prices will accrue to developed countries.
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within them - will be the resultant of a number of effects, short run
and longer run. Much emphasis has understandably been given to the
balance of payments effects but in terms of particular sections of the
population, especially those in poverty, the repercussions following
price increases of oil-based or oil-related products (especially
fertilisers, small-scale diesel irrigation pumps, cooking fuel and
transportation) may be more significant.
The impact on the poorest countries and on the poorest groups
within countries is particularly important because these are the
sections of the Third World whose position was already serious
before the oil price increases. Over the 1960s, the rate of growth of
per capita income in the poorest countries was under half that of the
middle income or rich countries (see Table 3), and at the same time
in some of them, most notably India, income distribution appeared
to worsen.
3. The Balance of Payments Effects
Clearly higher oil prices benefit generally the 11 oil exporting
countries and hit to a greater or less extent the oil importing
countries. Several sets of estimates are available identifying the
magnitudes of these direct effects.2
Tables 1 and 2 attempt to group the Third World countries gaining
and losing from the oil price increases by continent and broad
income category - using the World Bank classification which divides
countries into the rich, middle income, poor and very poor.
A Third World country has been listed as hardest hit if it is a net oil
importer with no major offsetting gains in trade (as estimated in a
paper by the Ministry of Overseas Development of 11 June 1974).
The 11 oil exporting gaining countries had a total (1971) population
of about 250 million, of which 176 million were in countries
2 See also the paper by Frank Ellis in this Bulletin.
3 Submitted to the U.K. Parliamentary Select Committee on Overseas Aid and
Devejopment, whose report "The Oil Crisis and Third World Development:
Ixhplications for United Kingdom Policy" is in press and will be available from
H.M.S.O., Atlantic House, Holborn Viaduct, London ECl 1BN.
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classified in 1971 as "very poor" (Indonesia and Nigeria), 54 million
in countries classified as poor (Iraq, Iran and Algeria), 11 million in a
middle income country (Venezuela) and 11 million in the five rich,
now very rich countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Qatar
and Libya). According to the World Bank estimates, about half the
additional oil revenues in 1974 will accrue to these five very rich
countries - and about one-tenth to the two very poor ones.
TABLE 1
Populations of OPEC member countries grouped by level of income and
continent (Population: millions in 1971)
Country classification Per capita income US $1970
R ich 1500 and above
Middle income 440-1490
Poor 160-430
Very poor 150 or less
Source: Level of per capita income and population in 1971 from World Bank
Atlas, 1973
loo
ASIA AFRICA LATIN
AMERICA
Total
population
Rich
countries
Saudi Arabia 8
Kuwait 1
Libya 2
Abu Ohabi -
Qatar -
9 11
Middle Income
countries Venezuela 11 11
Poor
countries
Iraq 10
Iran 30
Algeria 14
Very Poor 40 54
countries Indonesia 119 Nigeria 57 176
Total Population 168 73 11 252
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TABLE 2
Populations of oil importers hardest hit by oil price increases, grouped by
level of income and continent (Population: millions in 1971)
Oil importers hardest hit are the countries of middle and low per capita incomes
without major offsetting trade gains or military assistance as estimated from
tables submitted by the Ministry of Overseas Development to the U.K.
Parliamentary Select Committee on Overseas Aid and Development, whose
report is in press. (N.B. as 0DM pointed out, all such lists involve important
elements of judgement).
Source: Level of per capita income and population in 1971 from World Bank
Atlas, 1973.
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ASIA AFRICA LATIN
AMERICA
Total
population
Middle Income
countries
Jamaica 2
Costa Rica 2
Panama 1
5 5
Poor Turkey 36 Mozambique
countries 8 Honduras 3
Mauritius 1
9 47
Very Poor India 551 Ethiopia 25
countries Bangladesh 72 Tanzania 13
Sri Lanka 13 Kenya 12
Malagasy 7
Cameroon 6
Upper
Volta 6
Mali 5
Malawi 5
Niger 4
Rwanda 4
Somalia 3
636 90 726
Total Populations 672 99 8 779
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TABLE 3
Impact of oil price increases on different country groups of the world economy
(Per capita income levels and growth rates by main country groups with total
income and populations)
Estimated impact of oil price changes 1974 and 1975
Source: Columns 1-4, calculated from World Bank Arlas, 1972. Columns 5-8 from Table 1 and 2
In contrast, the countries hardest hit within the Third World appear
to come primarily from the poor and very poor group, and
predominantly from the latter. The three hardest hit countries of
Asia, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, are all countries classified as
very poor and in 1971 had a total population of 636 million. In
addition at least 11 African countries classified as very poor are
badly hit, with a combined 1971 population of 90 million.
The incidence of Third World countries gaining and losing is put into
broader perspective in Table 3, which summarises the changes from
oil price increases in relation to 1970 levels of income and
population and growth of per capita income over the previous
decade. In terms of numbers of countries and the size of population
affected, distribution within the world economy appears to have
worsened. The very poor group of countries which are hit have in
total over four times the population of the very poor countries which
have gained.
An important reason why the (short run) impact in 1974 and 1975
of the oil price increases is concentrated on a relatively limited
number of less developed countries is that in many other countries
export earnings and foreign exchange reserves have been built up in
the last few years from the boom in commodity prices. It follows,
however, that the number of countries hit severely and the extent of
their need may increase after 1975 to the extent that commodity
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Per capita
Per copito
growth Total
Toral
population Countries clearly gaining
Countries of middle and
low income hardest hit
Country income 196g-70 GNP 1970 1970 Population Population
group (SUS 1970) (% p.o.) (SUS bI (million) Number (1971 million) Number (1971 million)
Rich 2790 4.4 2570 920 5 11 - -
Middle Income 870 4.5 270 310 1 11 3 5
Poor 300 3.2 155 520 3 54 4 47
Verypoor 120 i.g 230 1930 2 f76 14 726
Total 880 4.1 3225 3680 11 252 21 779
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prices fall and foreign exchange reserves decline in response to a
downturn in activity and imports by the industrialised countries - of
which there have already been signs. The risk of a deterioration in
world prices is particularly great for commodities like copper, tin and
bauxite, for which world demand is especially sensitive to the level of
investment activity in the industrialised countries.
For some countries, in the short and medium run, an inflow of
financial resources from the oil-exporting countries, or an increase in
their demand for the countries' exports, could more than offset the
unfavourable balance of payments effects. The orders of magnitude
given at the beginning of this paper suggest that proportionately only
about a fifth of the additional oil revenues need be "recycled" via
the Third World to more than offset in aggregate the additional costs
of higher oil imports.' (The latter are estimated to be $US 10 billion;
a fifth of the additional $US 65 billion of oil revenues would be $US
13 billion).
Nevertheless, in absolute terms even sus 13 billion is an enormous
sum. It would need considerable enterprise and organisation to
achieve recycling even of this magnitude, particularly when the
historical ties and existing institutions mostly emphasise links in
other directions.
Moreover, even if recycling in aggregate is achieved, the pattern of
recycling flows of export orders and investment from the
oil-exporting countries into the rest of the Third World may differ
considerably from the pattern of countries hardest hit by balance of
payments problems arising from the incidence of oil price increases.
There is thus a double need. First, to ensure that a sufficient degree
of recycling takes place, almost certainly well beyond what will take
place without special measures, international and national. Second,
In addition there will be the higher costs of other imports, particularly of
oil-based products but of manufactures in general, the prices of which have been
rising rapidly with inflation. The net effects of these are difficult to estimate but
have already raised aggregate non-OPEC Third World foreign exchange
requirements considerably.
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to ensure that the pattern of trade, investment and financial flows
generated by the recycling provides adequate support to the hardest
hit countries.
4. Price Increases of Oil-based Products
In addition to the overall balance of payments effects, the price
increases of oil and oil-based products relative to other prices is likely
to have major consequences for the pattern of development and of
income distribution within countries.
Clearly the impact needs to be traced through in the particular
context of the major countries involved. Some conclusions from a
World Bank assessment on the impact of higher oil prices in the
Asian region may indicate something of what is involved.
"At the new prices, petroleum remains quite competitive with other
forms of energy. Nevertheless, the economics of energy production
and use are obviously much affected. Hydroelectric power is now an
economic substitute up to roughly double the level of capital costs
previously considered economic. Rural electrification is now
preferable to diesel tubewells up to two or three times the previously
economic capital cost. Obviously, coal extraction becomes much
more economical and investment plans should be accordingly
re-oriented.
The share of fuel costs in road transport operating costs may increase
from about 10 to about 25-30 per cent before taxes. The consequent
15-20 per cent increase in road transport costs might, in many cases,
improve the competitiveness of the railways which use two to four
times less energy per ton mile, and which in several countries can rely
on cheaper energy sources (coal, electricity).
The quadrupling of petroleum prices would very roughly double the
cost of fertiliser production, and similarly affect those of
petrochemicals, in particular of synthetic fibres and of rubber. Thus,
the long-term cost of urea production is now over sus ioo per ton.
However, given the shortage of capacity, the price is likely to remain
at the present level of sus 175-200 per ton ($L15 430 per
nutrient-ton) during the next several years, until new Middle Eastern
capacity comes into production".
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It is not easy to assess in general terms the effects of these price
changes on the prospects for growth and distribution in all the
countries affected. In many respects, the impact on the cost of
fertiliser, rural energy and transport can do little to help and much to
harm rural development, whether it is development among the richer
or the poorer members of the rural community.
Exceptions are possible of course. One important exception arises
from the increased attractiveness which natural products will now
have over oil-based synthetics (e.g. pyrethrum over DDT) - which is
a reminder of the need to redirect and support technological research
in these directions, and to encourage activities which would expand
trade and production of such commodities.
Even if there is an overall decline in a country's output, some factors
may act to improve income distribution in favour of the poorer
groups. If, for instance, a decline in food production is concentrated
among fertiliser-using large farmers, food prices may increase and
thus possibly agricultural incomes of smaller farmers. But however
favourable these partial effects on rural income, they are unlikely to
offset the disastrous general consequences of a reduction of Third
World food supply, particularly in 1974 conditions, with many
countries already hard hit by drought.
5. A Framework for Policy
As regards the long-term, the crucial issue is to see the oil price
increase as a major move broadly in the right direction, even if
excessively rapid, and grotesquely unbalanced in its effects. This is so
both inasmuch as the bargaining position of Third World countries in
trade relations may improve in the future as a result of the lead given
by the oil exporters; and insofar as the price increase has beneficial
long-term technological and distributional effects in favour of the
poorer groups within countries, particularly poor countries.5
These favourable results do not uniformly follow from the oil price increases
but in several respects they may and - if the oil revenues are used aright,
particularly by the richer oil-exporting countries - they could follow in much
greater measure.
105
ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND
SOME POLICY SUGGESTIONS
It would without any doubt be much better for such moves to have
taken place as part of a concerted strategy for reforming world
economic relationships, especially the structure and prices of world
trade and the distribution of income which results from it. But as
with many other major events in economic and social reform the first
moves are often precipitate. The real issue, now that the terms of
trade for one set of countries have been so dramatically changed, is
how future changes in world economic relationships can be
progressively undertaken in a coordinated and, if possible, mutually
agreed manner.
In the short run, the extent to which the impact on non-oil Third
World countries is relieved or exacerbated will primarily depend on
the extent to which:-
(j) special credit facilities are made available, internationally;
the industrialised countries can alter, individually or in concert,
their national patterns of aid, investment, trade and financial flows in
favour of Third World hardest hit oil countries;
differential pricing arrangements for oil (in one form or
another) are introduced in favour of Third World oil importing
countries;
the oil-exporting countries and the developed countries increase
their imports from the Third World or jointly find ways to recycle oil
revenues to Third World countries via investment, loans or aid.
A number of measures of the first type are at present under
discussion including an IMF oil facility (Witteveen), IMF special
drawing rights, the sale of World Bank bonds to oil exporting
countries, the United Nations Coordinating Mechanism for
Emergency Relief and Special Fund, various oil producer funds and
bilateral agreements. The EEC countries have proposed a scheme
whereby they would contribute $500 million, other industrialised
countries $1000 million and the oil producing countries $1500 - a
total of $3 billion possibly to be channelled through the UN
Coordinating Mechanism. At the time of writing, most of these
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approaches are still under discussion and, given the fluidity of the
situation, it is impossible to make any definitive assessment.
Nevertheless one must emphasise that (a) the total sums under
discussion begin to look just about adequate for 1974 but seriously
inadequate ¶or 1975 and later, (b) that for some hardest hit countries
the likely provision still falls far short of the estimated deficits in the
balance of payments for 1974 let alone for later years, (c) the
proposals are so far primarily short-term measures, and (d) with the
sharp reduction expected in the growth rate of the industrialised
countries in 1974 and 1975, the growth rate of their imports will
also be greatly reduced. This in turn will reduce both the volumes
and prices of most exports from the Third World, thus exacerbating
their balance of payments problems, especially those which have
recently benefitted from the higher commodity prices.
The second approach appears to have been less explored, even
though in overall impact is it likely to be limited in relation to the
magnitude of the problem, especially given the balance of payments
pressures which the industrialised countries will themselves be
experiencing. Nevertheless, in selective areas a shift in the pattern of
traditional aid, investment, trade and financial flows could be an
important addition to other measures.
The third approach could be very helpful though currently it seems
to be ruled out by OPEC. It would have the possible disadvantage of
encouraging oil-intensive sources of energy in countries with access
to cheap oil (though this could be avoided with offsetting internal
taxes).
The fourth approach quantitatively is potentially of the order of
magnitude and has the scope to deal with the problems. Morever, it
would be along lines required to reinforce moves towards a long-run
reconstruction of the world economy as is more generally needed.
The small size of their populations and the magnitude and the
rapidity of the increases in oil revenues means that in many of the
richer oil-exporting countries it will be impossible to absorb all the
revenues internally or spend all the reserves as imports, at least for
some years. The impact on other Third World countries will thus
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primarily depend on the extent of recycling as measured by the
magnitude and direction of:-
flows of investment funds, into real or portfolio investments within
the less developed countries;
flows of development assistance from the oil-exporting countries,
whether concessionary or not, whether direct or via regional
investment banks;
flows of short-term funds (or purchases of gold).
As regards all of these, there are as indicated strong institutional
arrangements built up over many years which will mean that unless
special measures are taken, the great bulk of the additional revenues
are likely to flow back directly to financial or industrial centres of
Western Europe, Eastern Europe or the United States. Nevertheless,
the Third World countries would greatly benefit (and the
industrialised countries lose little) if an increased share of the
revenues were to be "recycled" via the Third World countries. Oil
revenue investments in Third World countries or orders for exports
from them would stimulate Third World activity, and, in turn,
stimulate further trade with the industrialised countries. There is no
obvious reason for believing that any or all developed countries
would do less well from the triangular trade stimulated by such
recycling arrangement than they would from bilateral arrangements
(though the types of goods involved and the particular links in the
trading and financial chain might be different). The Third World
would, however, gain substantially.
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